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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Administrative Law-Criminal Law-Powers of
Administrative Boards
By North Carolina statute1 any District Health .Joard was given
authority to "make such rules and regulations, . . and enforce such
penalties as in its judgment shall be necessary to protect and advance
the public health." One of the Boards provided 2 that for the violation
of its various ordinances the court should have power to punish by fine,
imprisonment, or both. In reversing a conviction under a Health Board
ordinance making it unlawful to sell milk in the District without a per-
mit, the court said that if the Board were authorized by statute to make
both the regulation and the penalty "it would run counter to the prin-
ciple that the legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law.' " 3
This case opens an inquiry as to what administrative boards are
permitted to do in the field of criminal law. Approaching the problem
logically the questions that may be raised are: (1) whether the admin-
istrative board acted within its statutory authorization, and, if so, (2)
is the statute under which it acted valid. The first question is one of
statutory construction and will not be discussed in detail here.4 The
attitude of the majority of courts has been that when there is criminal
liability attached, the regulation should clearly be warranted by the
legislative act.
The second question may be divided into four types of problems:
(A) Was the administrative body legally given authority to make the
regulation? (B) Did the legislature say that the violation of the regu-
lation was to be a crime or was authority to do this given to the admin-
istrative agency? (C) Did the legislature fix the penalty or did it
authorize the administrative agency to do so? (D) Was it the court or
the administrative body which was authorized to determine guilt or
innocence and assess the penalty?
(A) This problem involves the constitutionality of legislation author-
izing the administrative body to make rules and regulations for carrying
out a statute. Except as to municipal corporations, most of the courts
adhere to the theory that under the doctrine of separation of powers a
true legislative function cannot be delegated; but they feel that admin-
IN. C. GEN. STAT. §130-66(4) (1945 Supp.).
2 §16, Public Health Service Ordinance of the District Board of Health of the
Counties of Burke, Caldwell, and McDowell.
' State v. Curtis, 230 N. C. 169, 52 S. E. 2d 364 (1949).
' See Schwenk, The Administrative Crf me, 42 MIcH. L. REv. 51, 66 (1943).
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istrative authority to make regulations is not such a function.5 If the
act which gives the right to make the regulations sets forth the legis-
lative policy and the general standards for the administrative body to
follow, it will be called either no delegation of legislative power 6 or a
constitutional delegation. 7 Although the test which the legislative act
must meet is not always stated the same way,8 the decisions have uni-
formly upheld the act when sufficient standards were provided.
Since the result of a case may depend on whether or not the court
finds there has been a delegation of legislative power, it is best to realize
that there are, in effect, two types of legislative power-one to deter-
mine policies and the other to fill in details. When courts say that
legislative functions are non-delegable they are thinking of the former;
then in an attempt to reconcile these statements on non-delegability with
the need for administrative regulations, they have often said that the
latter power is one that is not legislative. But administrative regula-
tions, which have the force and effect of law, are certainly substantially
the same as legislation. The Wisconsin court made a clear analysis of
the situation, saying, in part, "When, however, the Legislature has laid
down these fundamentals of a law [its general purpose or policy and
the limits of its operation], it may delegate to administrative agencies
the authority to exercise such legislative power as is necessary to carry
into- effect the general legislative purpose; . . . . It only leads to con-
fusion and error to say that the power to fill up the details and pro-
mulgate rules and regulations is not legislative power."
The fact that the violation of the regulations will be a crime does
not seem to vary the approach of a court in determining whether regu-
lations can be made under a particular statute. Although aware that
the regulations define the elements of a crime, the courts usually discuss
the authority to make regulations in the same manner as they do when
there is a civil penalty, adding only that a criminal penalty for the
violation does not change the result. A leading illustration of this is
'Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414 (1944).
'United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506 (1910); United States v. Tishman,
99 F. 2d 951 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U. S. 636 (1939) ; State v. Dudley,
182 N. C. 822, 109 S. E. 63 (1921).
' Lotto v. United States, 157 F. 2d 623 (8th Cir. 1946); Oklahoma v. U. S.
Civil Service Commission, 153 F. 2d 280 (10th Cir. 1946), aff'd, 330 U. S. 127(1947).
1 (1) The legislature can make a law to delegate a power to determine some
facts or state of facts upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own
action depend. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506 (1910) ; State v. Curtis,
230 N. C. 169, 52 S. E. 2d 364 (1949). (2) After declaring its policy and fixing
a primary standard, the legislature may leave the administrative officers power to
fill up the details by prescribing rules. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S.
388 (1935) ; Motsinger v. Perryman, 218 N. C. 15, 9 S. E. 2d 511 (1940).
° State ex rel. Wisconsin Inspection Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472, 505,
220 N. W. 929. 941 (1928).
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United States v. Grihnaud,10 wherein Congress had set the standards
within which the Secretary of Agriculture could make regulations to
preserve the forests and had declared that violations of the regulations
would result in criminal liability. The Supreme Court, in upholding the
defendants' conviction over the objection that it was unconstitutional
for an administrative board to declare what should be a crime, said:
". .. nor are such rules raised from an administrative to a legislative
character because the violation thereof is punished as'a public offense."
North Carolina has not altered its decisions as to the validity of the
grant of regulation-making power by reason of the fact that violation
of the regulations is a crime."1
(B) It is the norlmal procedure for a legislature to declare that any
violations of the administrative regulations will be a crime, and there
is no question as to the validity of this. This method was approved in
the Grimaud case where the Court relied heavily on the point that Con-
gress, rather than the administrative officer, had said that the failure to
obey the regulations would be a crime.
On the other hand, the authorities agree that it is unconstitutional
for the legislature to give an administrative agency power to decide
whether actions contrary to its rules should be crimes. In People v.
Grant12 the legislature said that the violation of any rule of the state
alcoholic board should be a misdemeanor if such rule so provided. In
reversing the defendant's conviction for one of these administratively
created crimes the court said: "The declaration of the crime and the
prescription of the penalty for the violation rest in the ultimate dis-
cretion of the Legislature." The same view was adopted by the Cali-
fornia court13 which said in a suit against a port authority that "no
such board or commission may declare a violation of such rules or
regulations ... to be a crime."
A method by which an administrative board may be given a share
in prescribing what shall be a crime is to grant it the power to dispense
with or suspend the operation of a law.14 In doing this the crime is set
forth by the legislature and the only power given to the agency is the
discretion to say when or upon what conditions it shall be enforced.
Such a power in an agency is not considered in the same category as
the making of a crime; therefore it is permitted when there is a suffi-
cient standard to control the agency's discretion.
10220 U. S. 506 (1910). Discussed in 1 N. C. L. REv. 50 (1922).
"' State v. Dudley, 182 N. C. 822, 109 S. E. 63 (1921) ; State v. Hodges, 180
N. C. 751, 105 S. E. 417 (1920); State v. R. R., 141 N. C. 846, 54 S. E. 294(1906); Express Co. v. R. R., 111 N. C. 463, 16 S. E. 393 (1892).
"2242 App. Div. 310, 275 N. Y. S. 74 (3d Dep't. 1934), aff'd, 267 N. Y. 508,
196 N. E. 553 (1935).
x Gilgert v. Stockton Port District, 7 Cal. 2d 384, 60 P. 2d 847 (1936).
x'87 U. OF PA. L. REv. 201 (1938) contains a discussion of this power in vari-
ous fields.
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(C) Closely related to the problem of making the violation of a
regulation a crime is that of determining the penalty for a violation.
The usual legislative act includes the penalties along with the statement
that violations of the regulations are to be crimes, and there is no ques-
tion as to the legality of this technique. On the issue of whether ad-
ministrative boards can set the penalties there has been little litigation,
and much of that has dealt with civil rather than criminal penalties. 15
The cases on administrative determination of civil penalties are impor-
tant because the same court would probably have a stricter attitude
toward permitting steps which would subject a person to criminal
punishment.
In a California case16 the board had been empowered to set penalties,
not exceeding a certain amount per violation, for disobedience of its
rules and regulations. The court held that although the board could
make regulations, "the penalty for the violation of such rules and regu-
lations is a matter purely in the hands of the legislature." The fact that
there was a maximum set by the legislature did not alter the opinion
of the court.
In Zuber v. Southern R. R.' 7 the Georgia Court of Appeals under-
took to interpret an earlier opinion of the Georgia Supreme Court1 8 which
had approved the fixing of civil penalties by an administrative agency.
It said that the supreme court must have felt that the legislative act
with which it was faced made it mandatory for the agency to provide
penalties for the disobedience of its regulations, and that therefore the
agency was doing what was merely an administrative action when it
determined the amount of these penalties. Nevertheless, the court of
appeals thought that unless the legislature had given at least a general
sanction to the prescription of civil or criminal penalties, no adminis-
trative board could take steps to prescribe them. It recognized that even
with the legislative directive the supreme court's decision was an ex-
tension of the Grirnaud doctrine.
In the instant case19 the legislature did not specify either that the
violation of the regulations was to be a crime or that certain penalties
were to be imposed for a violation; and since these determinations were
left to the discretion of the administrative board, the decision reversing
the conviction is in accord with the authorities above discussed. These
defects had been remedied by the legislature after the conviction below,
but the court would give no indication as tor the result under the new
statute.
1 The language of the Granut case, quoted in the previous section, indicates that
the prescribing of a criminal penalty is considered to be a legislative function.
" Board of Harbor Commissioners v. Excelsior Redwood Co., 88 Cal. 491.
26 Pac. 375 (1891).179 Ga. App. 539, 71 S. E. 937 (1911).
18 Southern R. R. v. Melton, 133 Ga. 277, 65 S. E. 665 (1909).
10 State v. Curtis, 230 N . C. 169, 52 S. E. 2d 364 (1949).
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(D) The determination of guilt and the imposition of punishment
for a crime are ordinarily done by the courts, with the administrative
board only instigating the prosecution of the defendant for the violation
of its rules and regulations. Whether or not an administrative board
will be permitted to impose a criminal penalty seems to depend on
whether the penalty is one that is flexible or inflexible. When an ad-
ministrative agency is given power to impose an inflexible penalty, it
amounts to nothing more than its ordinary process of finding the facts
and determining whether there has been a violation. The Supreme Court
has given its approval to the adminstrative imposition of this type pen-
alty.20  On the other hand, a flexible penalty was held unconstitutional
in Wong Wing v. United States,21 where the Commissioner of Immigra-
tion placed a punishment upon the defendant in addition to ordering him
to be deported. In Tite v. State Tax Cammission,22 where the problem
was considered at length, the Utah court said that it was permissible for
an administrative board to impose a set penalty, but not a discretionary
one. If a board does undertake to hear a case its procedure must meet
the constitutional requirement of due process. 28
Today administrative boards are given the right to impose many
civil penalties which are in effect the same or worse than criminal ones.
A fine brings an equivalent result whether levied by a board or a court,
and a license revocation by a board is often more damaging than a court
fine would be. A striking example of a civil penalty having the effect
of a criminal one is Helvering v. Mitchell,24 where a taxpayer had to
pay a fraud penalty although he had previously been acquitted on crim-
inal charges of willfully attempting to evade the income tax. When a
revenue officer determines that there has been fraud or the like, he is
doing something which is thought of as judicial, yet the courts have
not balked at permitting such determinations. Likewise in workmens'
compensation statutes there is often authorization for the board to im-
pose penalties to facilitate the functioning of the act.25 To public
utilities commissions, immigration officials, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, etc., are given broad powers to impose monetary penalties
for failure to obey the statutes and rules. Since an administrative
agency will be cognizant of the forces at work in its field, it should be
able to do an intelligent job of imposing the necessary penalties.
20 Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320 (1909); Passa-
vant v. United States, 148 U. S. 214 (1892); Bartlett v. Kane, 16 How. 263(1853).
2 163 U. S: 228 (1895).2289 Utah 404, 57 P. 2d 734 (1936).
2 Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1 (1938); National Labor Relations
Board v. Prettyman, 117 F. 2d 786 (6th Cir. 1941).
24303 U. S. 391 (1938).
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. §§97-18(e), 92(e) (1943); GELLHoRN, ADMINISTRATrn
LAW CASES AND COMMENTS 334 (2d ed. 1947).
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Notwithstanding the fact that they may validly be given authority
to impose penalties, administrative boards have not yet been given the
power to order imprisonment. There is little need for administrative
boards to operate in this area, and public opinion would be strongly
against executive officials prescribing such punishment.26 In the Wong
Wing case27 the Court felt that a person should have a judicial trial
before he could be punished by having his liberty taken away.
MARSHALL T. SPEARs, JR.
Corporations-Foreign-Suability After Dissolution
Under the common law the dissolution of a corporation extinguished
its debts, actions against it were abated, its real property reverted to its
grantors, and its personal property escheated to the King.' The event
was likened to the death of a natural person.2 This rule was tolerated
so long as there were only municipal, ecclesiastical, and eleemosynary
corporations in existence. But with the growth of business corporations,
accompanied by their shareholders and creditors, the harshness of such
a rule was manifest, and the equity courts were persuaded that the assets
of a dissolved corporation should be declared a trust fund for the satis-
faction of claims by creditors and other interested parties.3 A later
development was the almost universal adoption of statutes which ex-
tended the life of a corporation after dissolution so that it could bring
and defend actions in the corporate name for the purpose of "winding
up" its affairs.
4
But extension statutes have not been completely effective, for much
confusion still exists when an action is brought involving as a party a
foreign corporation which has been dissolved by the state which created
it. In such a case the general rule is said to be that the law of the
creating state governs, and that when the corporation's very existence
is terminated by the state of domicile it cannot be a party to a suit else-
where. Similarly, if the law of the creating state extends the life of
the corporation after dissolution for a winding up period, it may gen-
erally sue or be sued in other jurisdictions because it still exists as an
entity for that purpose.6 On the other hand, these extensions may be
20 GELLHORN, op. cit. supra note 25, 348.
163 U. S. 228 (1895).
See Life Ass'n. of America v. Fassett, 102 Ill. 315 (1882); 2 BEALE, CON-
FLcr oF LAws 742 (1935); 17 FLETCHER CYCL. CoRe. 775 (1942); Note, 97
A. L. R. 483 (1935).
"See Chicago Title Co. v. Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U. S. 120, 124 (1937).
' Marcus, Suability of Dissolved Corporations, 58 HRV. L. REv. 675 (1945).
' 16 FLETCHER CYcL. CORP. 930 (1942).
*2 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 742; Note, 47 A. L. R. 1288, 1557 (1927).8 Harris-Woodbury Lumber Co. v. Coffin, 179 Fed. 257 (W. D. N. C. 1910).
aff'd, 187 Fed. 1005 (4th Cir. 1911).
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